Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

In order to improve the quality of food safety information disclosure in traceability system, the study of the influence of related factors on their internal relations in the process of information disclosure was carried out. First, a model of food safety information disclosure between food enterprises and government regulators was built based on the theory of evolutionary game. And then, the route of model evolution was intelligent simulated by Matlab, and different key parameters was adjusted individually to lead the evolution to an ideal condition. The result shows that the problem of false food safety information cannot be solved effectively only relying on government supervision. The power of societal supervision is necessary to clear the market of false food safety information. The combination of the increase in governmental penalty, lowering of governmental supervision cost, improvement of societal supervisory strength, and increase the societal losses of the enterprises due to false food safety information, will effectively result in a quality increase of food safety information published by enterprises, and paves its way for the formation and perfection of an ideal food traceability system.

Keywords

Food safety information disclosure government regulation societal supervision evolutionary game

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

and Sun

W.J.

, Who will feed the giant? - Chinese pollution andgrain crisis, Iranian Journal of Public Health44(10) (2015), 1420–1421.

Suyun

, Internal Control Quality, Institutional environment and food quality information disclosure, Issues in Agricultural Economy2 (2016), 83–90.

Lian

and Qiuyu

, Thinking on problems and countermeasures of agricultural products quality and safety traceability system construction–Based on the empirical analysis of Sichuan province, Rural Economy2 (2012), 30–33.

Qiang

, Yilin

and Jianyu

, Incentives, information and food safety regulation, Economic Research Journal3 (2013), 135–147.

Dzwolak

, Practical aspects of traceability in small food businesses with implemented food safety management systems, Journal of Food Safety36(2) (2016), 203–213.

Mattevi

and Jones

J.A.

, Traceability in the food supply chain: Awareness and attitudes of UK Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, Food Control64 (2016), 120–127.

Sanxi

, Peitz

and Xiaojian

, Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers, Mathematical Social Science70(70) (2014), 59–67.

Hongbin

, Hu

and Xuyang

, A theoretical analysis of lack of reputation among Chinese firms, Economic Research Journal9 (2006), 85–93.

Wenyi

and Kai

, Inter-governmental game model and policy implication of food safety regulation, Chinese Public Administration7 (2014), 101–105.

10.

Yan

, On the food safety information disclosure system in China, Journal of Anhui Agricultural University (Social Sciences Edition)22(4) (2013), 28–33.

11.

Xin

, On the improvement of the efficiency of China’s food safety information disclosure system, Journal of Jiangsu University (Social science edition)14(1) (2012), 89–92.

12.

Guoxing

, Wanxia

and Xin

, Evolutionary game model of food safety supervision based on the third-party intendance, Journal of Systems Engineering2 (2015), 153–164.

13.

Xunping

and Guanghua

, Evolutionary game analysis on behavior supervision of food industry based on prospect theory, Systems Engineering2 (2016), 82–88.

14.

Benhong

, Xiaofen

and Qian

, Analysis of evolutionary game of stakeholders in service-oriented manufacturing project governance, Journal of System Simulation29(3) (2017), 595–608.

15.

Ramesh Kumar

Padmanaban

and Balamurugan

, Optimal Tolerance allocation na complex assembly using evolutionary algorithms, International Journal of Simulation Modelling15(1) (2016), 1726–4529.

16.

Mahdiraji

H.A.

, Zavadskas

E.K.

and Hajiagha

S.H.R.

, Game theoretic approach for coordinating unlimited multi echelon supply chains, Transformations in Business & Economics14(2) (2015), 133–151.

17.

, Evolutionary game analysis of emergency management of the middle route of south-to-north water diversion project, Water Resources Management31(9) (2017), 2777–2789.

18.

Jurado

and Kamel

, Simplified model of static VAR compensator in current injection power flow, DYNA90(5) (2015), 204–213.

19.

Deng

and Lu

J.Y.

, The environmental performance, corporate social responsibility, and food safety of food companies from the perspective of green finance, Revista de Cercetare si Interventie Sociala58 (2017), 178–200.

Evolutionary game and intelligent simulation of food safety information disclosure oriented to traceability system

Abstract

Keywords

Get full access to this article

References