Foulweather Friends: Violence and Third Party Support in Self-Determination Conflicts

Abstract

This paper investigates how violence in self-determination conflicts influences bilateral foreign policy. I argue that a general preference for international stability causes third parties to support self-determination groups when violence reaches high levels, when they gain territorial control, and when major powers officially recognize. In these conditions, third parties perceive a stable new status quo to be nigh: unrecognized statehood. Ongoing instability encourages foreign policy that encourages the development of the de facto state, even when third parties have no intention of recognizing them as states. Importantly, I also show that targeting civilians erodes third-party support of the perpetrating side. I demonstrate these relationships using a latent variable model of international sovereignty of aspiring states, built on bilateral military, diplomatic, and economic exchange data. My model and tests provide new insight into how aspiring state actors become increasingly eligible for recognition through the tacit support of third-party states.