This article presents an explanation to observed trends in redistribution and cultural and political polarization. I extend a one-dimensional voting model by taking into account that voters, in addition to having economic preferences, also care about cultural issues. Political parties diverge in the cultural dimension to be able to implement different tax rates. A higher level of pre-tax income inequality makes it more difficult to win the election by proposing a low tax rate, but the right-wing party may be able to win the election by bundling a low tax rate with a focus on cultural issues.
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